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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-4475
_____________
MARION FELIX,
Appellant
v.
GMS, ZALLIE HOLDINGS, INC., incorrectly captioned as
“SHOPRITE OF KNORR STREET”, “SHOPRITE #440”
and “ZALLIE SUPERMARKETS, INC.”;
CANADA DRY DELAWARE VALLEY BOTTLING COMPANY;
SHOPRITE OF KNORR STREET; SHOPRITE 400;
ZALLIE SUPERMARKETS, INC.
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 2:10-cv-04654)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 20, 2012
______________
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and O‟MALLEY*, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: October 11, 2012)
*

Hon. Kathleen M. O‟Malley, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

______________
OPINION
______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
This case arises from the District Court‟s order granting summary judgment to
Appellees GMS Zallie Holdings, Inc. (“GMS”) and Canada Dry Delaware Valley
Bottling Company (“Canada Dry”). Appellant Marion Felix (“Felix”) brought a
negligence action against Appellees following a slip and fall incident in a ShopRite
grocery store. Appellees each moved for summary judgment alleging that the record did
not contain evidence indicating notice or constructive notice of the condition contributing
to Felix‟s fall. The District Court granted the Appellees‟ motions, and Felix now appeals.
For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the District Court‟s order and opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the
essential facts.
On September 2, 2008, Felix was shopping at the ShopRite grocery store located
at Knorr Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. While shopping near a freezer section, she
slipped on a puddle of liquid and fell. As she lay on the ground, she observed that the
puddle contained a clear liquid with dust particles floating on the surface. She could not
identify the source of the liquid and was unaware of how long it had been there.
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The store manager, Mike Roth (“Roth”), responded to the incident and noted that
there had been a Canada Dry pallet in the vicinity of the accident ten to twenty minutes
earlier. Consequently, he speculated that the liquid had come from the pallet, although he
had not seen any liquid leaking from the pallet and was unaware of any liquid being on
the floor before the incident. Anthony Sofia (“Sofia”), Felix‟s boyfriend, and Sean Early
(“Early”), a Canada Dry employee in charge of stocking products, were also in the store
that day. Sofia was not near Felix at the time of the incident, but testified that he noticed
the clear puddle of liquid with a footprint in it upon arriving to the area of the fall. Early
testified that he had spilled a can of orange Sunkist soda earlier in the day, but had
cleaned up the spill.
On November 17, 2011, the District Court granted Appellees‟ motions for
summary judgment on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to raise a genuine
dispute of fact regarding either defendant‟s actual or constructive notice of the puddle of
liquid. Felix filed a timely appeal.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Our standard of review applicable to an order granting summary judgment is plenary.
Huston v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “where the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Nicini v. Morra,
212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).1 The
inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). “Once the moving party
points to evidence demonstrating no issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party
has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists
and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.” Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l
Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of
Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009). “Further, „[w]e may affirm the District Court[‟s
order granting summary judgment] on any grounds supported by the record.‟” Kossler v.
1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was revised in 2010. The standard previously set forth in subsection
(c) is now codified as subsection (a). The language of this subsection is unchanged,
except for “one word — genuine „issue‟ bec[ame] genuine „dispute.‟” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
advisory committee‟s note, 2010 amend.
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Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805
(3d Cir. 2000)).
Under Pennsylvania law, a negligence claim has four elements:
(1) a duty or obligation recognized by the law, requiring the actor to
conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks; (2) a failure to conform to the standard required; (3) a
causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4)
actual loss or damage resulting in harm to the interests of another.
Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 139 (3d Cir. 2005).
To establish a breach of duty, Felix must prove that GMS or Canada Dry “had
either direct [actual] or constructive notice of the foreign substance on the floor as a
potentially dangerous condition.” See David v. Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas, 740
F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he issue of prior notice to
the store, either actual or constructive, of an unreasonable risk of harm is more difficult to
establish [than establishing the presence of a foreign substance on the floor].” Id. at 234
(emphasis in original). Actual notice exists if the store had been warned about the
condition of the liquid on the floor beforehand. Alternatively, a party may show
constructive notice by “demonstrating that the floor condition had existed for such a
length of time that the storeowner, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have been
aware of the condition.” See id. at 236.
Felix argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of both GMS and Canada Dry. In doing so, she asserts that there was sufficient evidence
in the record to create a dispute of fact as to whether GMS (as the owner and operator of
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the ShopRite store) had both actual and constructive notice. According to Felix, GMS
had actual notice of the hazardous liquid condition based on Roth‟s testimony that the
liquid may have come from the Canada Dry pallet or from the nearby freezer area. She
also argues that the dust on top of the puddle provided evidence that it had been there for
a sufficiently long period of time to establish constructive notice. Similarly, Felix seizes
on Early‟s testimony indicating that he had spilled an orange soda in the area earlier that
day as evidence of Canada Dry‟s notice and creation of the hazardous liquid condition.
We hold, as the District Court did, that Felix‟s arguments fail since they do not create a
dispute of fact as to how long the hazardous liquid condition existed.
To begin with, there is no evidence that either GMS or Canada Dry had actual
notice of the hazardous liquid condition. Contrary to Felix‟s assertions, Roth‟s testimony
provides no indication that any representative of the grocery store was aware of the
puddle on the floor. His speculation about the Canada Dry pallet is just that —
speculation; he neither observed the liquid coming from the pallet nor had any knowledge
that a spill was caused in that way. Although Early admitted to spilling a can of Sunkist
soda at an earlier time, his testimony that he cleaned up the spill with paper towels and
Windex cleaning solution, combined with the fact that the liquid he spilled was orange
and not clear, render this insufficient evidence of notice on behalf of Canada Dry.
Felix‟s constructive notice arguments must also fail. Felix asserts that there is a
genuine issue of fact regarding constructive notice based on the following: (1) Roth‟s
testimony regarding the safety inspection procedures for the store; (2) Felix‟s testimony
6

that there was dust in the liquid puddle at the time of her fall; and (3) Roth‟s testimony
indicating that a Canada Dry pallet was in the area ten to twenty minutes before her fall.
Felix asserts that GMS failed to use reasonable care because the ShopRite store
did not monitor for spills, thus enabling dangerous conditions to exist for periods of time
without a cure. In doing so, she cites Roth‟s testimony stating that there were no set
times for monitoring, but that there was a schedule for monitoring the floors that lasted
from morning to night each day. See App. at 82-83. Because Roth could not confirm any
precise time at which the floors were monitored, Felix attempts to characterize the
testimony as evidence that no such policy or procedure existed. Such characterization is
inaccurate. App. at 86 (“It‟s not set to a certain time or log or written. The maintenance
people are told when they are cleaning and mopping to get around the store and check.
That to me is an inspection.”). Consequently, GMS‟s alleged lack of monitoring
procedures is insufficient evidence of constructive notice in this case.
As the District Court properly noted, Felix‟s statement that there was dust in the
puddle is also insufficient to show constructive notice. We have previously rejected this
argument in similar cases where, as here, the plaintiff “offered no evidence of how much
dust was found, how long it would have taken for dust to accumulate, or whether the dust
was picked up off the floor by the spreading [liquid] or the force of [plaintiff‟s] fall.”
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, Felix stated that there
were approximately six or seven dust balls (each the size of one quarter of a pencil
eraser); however, the presence of the dust in the puddle after Felix‟s fall still “does not
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inform any decision as to the amount of time the [liquid] was on the floor before the fall.”
Id. Consequently, the District Court did not err in rejecting her constructive notice
argument on this ground.
Similarly, the fact that the Canada Dry pallet was in the same area before the fall
does not imply any form of notice because there is no evidence indicating that the pallet
was leaking, had liquid near it or had otherwise caused the liquid puddle on the floor.
Because we require more than mere speculation to establish constructive notice, this
argument must also fail. See Myers v. Penn Traffic Co., 606 A.2d 926, 930 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (citing Martino v. Grant Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 213 A.2d 608, 610 (Pa. 1965)).
The record is devoid of any evidence indicating how the hazardous condition came
about or indicating that either GMS or Canada Dry was previously aware of the liquid
puddle. As such, the District Court did not err in concluding that Felix‟s speculative
assertions failed to create a genuine dispute of fact.
B. Spoliation
Felix also argues that the District Court erred in denying her request for a
spoliation inference based on GMS‟s failure to provide security camera footage showing
her fall. GMS had security cameras operating throughout the store — some of which
were stationary while others moved to cover different angles and areas. App. at 123-24.
When GMS submitted the footage from the surveillance cameras into evidence, while it
showed Felix lying on the floor, it did not show the actual fall or the events leading up to

8

it. Felix asserts that the fact that the surveillance footage begins only after the fall
implies spoliation or destruction of evidence by GMS.
The spoliation rule applies when the evidence in question is in the party‟s control
and it “appear[s] that there has been an actual suppression or withholding of the
evidence.” Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995). “No
unfavorable inference arises when the circumstances indicate that the document or article
in question has been lost or accidentally destroyed, or where the failure to produce it is
otherwise properly accounted for.” Id. Applying this standard, the District Court
concluded that there was no evidence of actual destruction of the evidence or other
suppression. In doing so, it noted that Felix had not provided any evidence that the
cameras had in fact captured the fall, nor had she contacted anyone in the ShopRite loss
prevention department to ascertain if such footage even existed.
Felix reasserts this spoliation argument on appeal but has not provided any
evidence that GMS destroyed evidence or otherwise engaged in efforts to suppress the
evidence. Absent such evidence, we cannot apply a spoliation inference. See id.
Consequently, we find no error in the District Court‟s failure to impose a sanction on the
grounds of spoliation.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s order granting
GMS‟s and Canada Dry‟s motions for summary judgment.
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